The recall of one's own past predictions about possible future event outcomes is often affected by knowing the actual outcome of that event. On average, recall of past predictions is closer to the actual outcome when the latter is known as opposed to when it is not. This phenomenon has been firmly established in the psychological literature. For example, Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) asked students to assess the probabilities of several possible outcomes of then U.S. President Nixon's visits to China and to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics prior to these events in 1972 (original judgments, OJ). After these visits had taken place, the same participants were asked to recall their original probability assessments (recollection of the original judgment, ROJ). As expected, the ROJ probabilities tended to be larger than the OJ probabilities for events perceived to have happened. In contrast, for events perceived not to have happened, the ROJ probabilities tended to be smaller than the OJ probabilities.
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A similar effect may be obtained by asking for plausibility ratings of difficult questions whose answers can typically be found in an almanac ("almanac questions"; e.g., absinthe is (a) a precious stone or (b) a liqueur). Fischhoff (1977, Experiment 1) and Wood (1978) obtained such ratings prior to informing their participants about the correct answers. As in Fischhoff and Beyth's (1975) study, true statements were rated more plausible in the ROJs compared with the OJs, whereas this effect was reversed for false statements. Also, Hell, Gigerenzer, Gauggel, Mall, and Miiller (1988) , among others, have shown that mean ROJs of informed participants tend to drift toward the correct numerical answer even if OJs and ROJs are neither probability nor plausibility assessments but numerical answers to almanac questions (e.g.,
How high is the Eiffel tower in Paris?).
These and related results 1 have been referred to as demonstrations of creeping determinism (Fischhoff, 1975) , knew-it-all-along effects (Fischhoff, 1977; Wood, 1978) , and-most often-hindsight bias (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990) . In their extensive review, Hawkins and Hastie (1990) concluded that hindsight 1 By related results we mean comparable effects obtained in studies involving a hypothetical design without any OJs. In studies using a hypothetical design, one group of participants is first informed about the outcome and then asked to give the numerical judgment they would have given had they not received the CJ [correct judgment] information (cf. Fischhoff, 1975) . These participants tend to give judgments that are closer to the CJ than do participants of a control group without CJ knowledge (see Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991, and Hawkins & Hastie, 1990 , for reviews). Although these results parallel those obtained with memory designs (in which participants first give their OJs and later are explicitly instructed to recall or recognize their OJ), these classes of studies should not be confused with each other because genuine memory processes cannot be investigated in the framework of a hypothetical design (see also Hertwig, Gigerenzer, & Hoffrage, 1997) . It is for this reason that we restrict our analyses to studies involving a memory design.
bias is a very robust phenomenon that has been demonstrated for several different areas such as judgments about political events, general knowledge, clinical diagnoses, elections, and sports results. Christensen-Szalanski and Willham (1991) confirmed Hawkins and Hastie's conclusion in a met a-analysis that was based on 122 hindsight bias studies published in 40 articles between 1975 and 1988. More recent work also showed hindsight bias effects in probability-learning paradigms (Hennessey & Edgell, 1991) , group situations (Stahlberg, Eller, Maass, & Frey, 1995) , and judgments on object attributes (Pohl & Gawlik, 1995) . The available empirical evidence indicates that participants are generally not aware of the effect of outcome knowledge on their hindsight judgments. Also, even if participants are informed about the existence of the hindsight bias phenomenon and instructed explicitly to avoid any bias in their own judgments, the size of the bias appears to be unaffected (Fischhoff, 1977; Pohl & Hell, 1996) . Hawkins and Hastie (1990) identified four different types of explanations of the hindsight bias phenomenon in the literature. These explanations correspond to four general strategies of generating ROJs in a hindsight bias study: (a) recall of the old belief, (b) anchoring on the current belief and adjustment, (c) rejudgment, and (d) motivated response adjustment. If one or more of these different strategies are affected by the outcome knowledge, then a hindsight bias is assumed to occur.
The first strategy, recall of the old belief, implies mat people attempt to recollect their OJ from episodic long-term memory and try to give an ROJ that is consistent with whatever is recollected. Outcome knowledge could prevent correct recollections by (a) destroying or disturbing the memory trace of the OJ or (b) reducing its accessibility. The latter effect is implied, for example, by the relative-tracestrength hypothesis put forward by Hell et al. (1988) , and the former effect is implied by FischhofFs (1975) classical immediate-assimilation hypothesis according to which "upon receipt of outcome knowledge judges immediately assimilate it with what they already know about the event in question" (Fischhoff, 1975, p. 297) . As a consequence of this assimilation process, the memory trace of the OJ is no longer available in its original form.
The second strategy, anchoring on the current belief and adjustment, consists of estimating the current (postoutcome) belief and then adjusting this estimate to reflect the state of uncertainty when generating the OJ. If outcome knowledge influences the current belief, then a hindsight bias could be the consequence of an imperfect adjustment process. There is indeed considerable empirical evidence demonstrating that adjustment processes usually do not fully compensate for anchor effects on human judgments (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) .
The third strategy, rejudgment, consists of trying to reconstruct the OJ by repeating the judgmental process that led to the OJ. Outcome knowledge could influence rejudgments in at least three ways. First, some contextual information that affected the OJ could be less accessible in the rejudgment process because it does not fit the outcome, and outcome-congruent contextual information could be highly accessible (Hasher, Attig, & Alba, 1981; Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977) . Second, evidence selected as potentially relevant for the rejudgment process could be evaluated differently with and without outcome knowledge. For example, some detail that was given a high weight in the OJ could still be accessible in the later rejudgment process, but it could be given a lower weight because it appears irrelevant when the outcome of the event is known. If the knowledge structure about the critical event changes as a consequence of outcome presentation (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975) , then we can expect such an effect. Third, the process of combining several weighted details to a unitary rejudgment could be affected by outcome knowledge.
The fourth and final strategy, motivated response adjustment, simply implies that participants tend to adjust their ROJs so that the participants' responses support a favorable self-presentation. Self-serving motivations may lead outcome-informed participants into consciously changing their initially unbiased ROJs toward the correct judgment (CJ) during the response-generation stage. In effect, they may claim that they knew it all along, demonstrating that they are intelligent, well-informed persons. Although one study reports significant correlations between interindividual differences in self-presentation motives and the magnitude of the hindsight bias effect (Campbell & Tesser, 1983) , the empirical evidence for this theoretical position is generally weak. Numerous studies have shown that experimental manipulations of motivational tendencies rarely affect the magnitude of the hindsight bias effect significantly in the expected direction (for reviews, see Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990 ; see also footnote 4). Moreover, Davies (1992, p. 73) pointed out that at least some of the motivational measures used by Campbell and Tesser (1983) are probably better conceived of as indicators of cognitive styles. These cognitive styles might affect anchoring and adjustment processes or rejudgment strategies and, thus, could account for the correlations observed by Campbell and Tesser without assuming motivated response adjustments. Hawkins and Hastie (1990) concluded that no single one of the different theoretical approaches alone can explain all results reported in the hindsight bias literature. Rather, "composite, multi-factor explanations will be required to provide complete accounts for any of the behavioral phenomena we have identified in this literature" (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990, p. 324) . Unfortunately, progress in this direction has been impeded by the methodological difficulty in determining uniquely the particular strategy that led to an ROJ in a certain judgment situation. As is typical for dependent variables in psychological research in general, measures of the magnitude of the hindsight bias effect can only globally quantify the differences in the ROJ distributions for situations with and without outcome information. In other words, all we can conclude from global measures of hindsight bias is that one or more of the strategies mentioned above were affected by the outcome knowledge, but we cannot deduce which particular strategy (or combination of strategies) was responsible for the observed hindsight bias effect. The same holds true for specific empirical indices often used as measures of certain cognitive strategies. For instance, the frequency of perfect recollection judgments (i.e., ROJ = OJ, with ROJ and OJ denoting the numerical values of ROJ and OJ, respectively) cannot be conceived of as an unbiased indicator of the direct-recall strategy in general because a match between ROJ and OJ is certainly necessary but not sufficient to conclude in favor of an underlying direct-recall mechanism (see Hawkins & Hastie, 1990, p. 321) . Other strategies such as rejudgment or even plain guessing could lead to the same observable event. What we have here is a decomposition problem that occurs in many branches of psychology (cf. e.g., Buchner, Erdfelder, & VaterrodtPliinnecke, 1995; Erdfelder, 1992) : The observable data reflect the joint effect of several psychological mechanisms and have to be decomposed appropriately to arrive at unconfounded measures of the underlying cognitive processes.
Goals of the Present Research
In this article, we pursue three goals. In line with Hawkins and Hastie's (1990) suggestions, our first goal is to present a general hindsight bias model that is based on a multifactor explanation of the hindsight bias effect. The model aims primarily at separating recollection and reconstruction biases in hindsight judgments. We define recollection biases as the effects of outcome knowledge on the direct-recall strategy. Reconstruction biases, in contrast, are defined as the effects of outcome knowledge on the strategies of rejudgment or of anchoring on the current belief and adjustment.
The second goal of this article is to show how the decomposition problem implied by our theoretical framework can be solved. We present a method for separately measuring biased and unbiased recollection and reconstruction processes. This second goal is linked to the first by the fact that our theoretical framework has the form of a stochastic model that contains the measures of the various cognitive processes as parameters to be estimated from sample data.
The third goal is empirical. We tested whether the model's parameters are psychologically valid measures of cognitive processes involved in hindsight bias experiments. We tried to achieve this goal by investigating empirically whether the model's parameters reflect the effects of experimental treatments in a way that is consistent with available background knowledge on the hindsight bias effect as well as with related research results. Note that to achieve this goal we had to use manipulations about which one would have little doubt as to the psychological processes they would affect. Thus, the purpose of our experiments was not to establish new empirical findings. Rather, we replicated well-known empirical results and selected simple manipulations with obvious psychological effects so that we could investigate whether these manipulations affected the predicted model parameters selectively. In that way, we were able to test whether the model's parameters are indeed unconfounded measures of specific cognitive processes as presupposed by the underlying psychological framework.
In line with the goals of this article, we first present our stochastic model of the hindsight bias effect. Next, we describe how empirical data can be analyzed statistically within the framework of this model. Then we report four experiments that aimed at systematically evaluating the psychological validity of the model and the model's parameters. Finally, the results of these experiments are discussed with respect to (a) the validity of the model and (b) the question of whether recollection biases, reconstruction biases, or both are responsible for the hindsight bias effect.
A Multinomial Processing Tree Model for the
Hindsight Bias Paradigm
The model we present here belongs to the class of multinomial processing tree models (Hu & Batchelder, 1994; Riefer & Batchelder, 1988) . Processing tree models are stochastic models that have been used successfully to estimate probabilities of unobservable events from frequencies of observable events both inside and outside the area of behavioral research. Threshold models of signal detection (Luce, 1963; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991) , models for several memory paradigms (Batchelder & Riefer, 1980 , 1990 Buchner et al., 1995; Riefer & Batchelder, 1995; Riefer & Rouder, 1992; Schweickert, 1993; Wagenaar & Boer, 1987) , as well as models for the analysis of questionnaire data (Garcia-Perez, 1987) , interrater agreement (Klauer & Batchelder, 1996) , and prepositional reasoning (Klauer & Oberauer, 1995) are among the numerous applications of processing tree models in psychological research. For applications in the area of genetics, see books by Elandt-Johnson (1971) and Weir (1990) .
Although processing tree models have quite a long history, it was only recently that Riefer and Batchelder (1988) as well as Hu and Batchelder (1994) pointed out the flexibility of this class of models and its utility for measurement purposes particularly within cognitive psychology. These authors also presented general methods for the statistical analysis of processing tree models. Last but not least, Hu (1993) developed a computer program that facilitates the development and application of processing tree models considerably.
Basic Considerations
Given the well-developed statistical theory and the large number of successful applications of processing tree models, a multinomial modeling approach to the multiple determinants of hindsight bias effects appears rather attractive. However, processing tree models require the data to be discrete so that each possible sample observation can be assigned to one and only one of a typically small number of observation categories. In contrast, the typical hindsight bias data are continuous. Erdfelder (1991 Erdfelder ( , 1992 proposed to solve this problem by focusing on the rank order of the three numerical quantities OJ, CJ, and ROJ (corresponding to the OJ, the CJ, and the ROJ, respectively). Consider, for instance, the situation in which persons try to recall their OJs to the almanac question What is the length of the river 
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Thames? The CJ to that question is 346 km. Given that a person's OJ was 510 km, and the ROJ was 420 km, then the rank order of the three numerical judgments would be CJ <
ROJ<OJ.
The set of all possible OJ-CJ-ROJ rank orders is illustrated in Table 1 . These rank orders constitute a manageable set of distinct observational categories while preserving the most important empirical information available in hindsight bias experiments, namely, whether the ROJ deviates from the OJ in the direction of the CJ (Rank Orders 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 10) , in the opposite direction (Rank Orders 1 and 6), or whether ROJ and OJ are identical (Rank Orders 2 and 7). The information about the degree of deviation between the ROJ and the CJ is lost when transforming the continuous data into rank orders. However, this loss is less severe than it might appear at first: Typical deviation measures such as the ROJ -OJ difference and the ROJ/OJ ratio often depend on arbitrary aspects of item scaling (e.g., whether temperature is indicated in terms of a Fahrenheit, Celsius, or Kelvin scale). Thus, neither of these deviation measures provides psychologically meaningful information above and beyond the simple rank orders.
Allowing for ties between OJ and ROJ as well as between CJ and ROJ, but precluding ties between OJ and CJ, we obtained exactly 10 different rank orders of OJ, CJ, and ROJ (see Table I If, in contrast, the CJ is binary (e.g., true vs. false or event happened vs. event did not happen), then only a subset of the rank orders depicted in Table 1 would be defined. Therefore, we restrict our attention to hindsight bias experiments in which not only the OJ and the ROJ but also the CJ correspond to realizations of continuous variables. Note, however, that a multinomial modeling approach is not restricted to this type of hindsight bias experiment. Dehn and Erdfelder (in press ), for instance, developed a multinomial model for experiments in which there exist no unique CJs. Similar approaches are possible for experiments using binary CJs.
In the present article, we assume that sample frequencies are available for each of the 10 categories shown in Table 1 for both a control condition and an experimental condition. In the control condition, participants give their OJ to an item and are later asked for an ROJ without being informed about the CJ for this item. The experimental condition differs from the control condition in that the participants are informed about the CJs at some time prior to generating their ROJs. All other context factors that might affect recollection or reconstruction processes (e.g., retention interval, retrieval cues, etc.) must be kept constant in both conditions. In addition, relevant nuisance variables such as the participants' ages or the item difficulty must not differ systematically between the experimental condition and the control condition. Although this requirement can best be met by assigning either the participants (in a between-subjects design) or the items (in a within-subject design) randomly to the two conditions, strict random assignment is not presupposed by our model. In fact, because there are quite a few field studies in the hindsight bias literature that could not make use of random assignments, it seemed wise to construct a model that provides for the possibility of different OJ distributions in the two conditions.
Model Derivation
Let Cj denote the event that rank order j (j ; = 1,..., 10) occurs in the control condition. Accordingly, £, denotes the event that rank order j occurs in the experimental condition. The sample frequencies of the events Cj and Ej are Y Uj and Y 2 ,p respectively. Thus, the total number of control observations is Ni -SJf,^.,-, and the total number of observations in the experimental condition equals N 2 = Xl=xY 2yi . In multinomial processing tree models, it is assumed that within each condition i {i-1, 2), the probability of a vector of sample frequencies follows the multinomial distribution (D 2 Hindsight bias effects can be investigated only if the OJ deviates more or less from the CJ. Thus, cases where the OJ was equal to the CJ-which are usually rare-have to be discarded from all further data analyses.
where p t j denotes the probability of rank orderJ in condition i and XJ2i Pij = 1-Given independence between experimental and control observations, the probability of the total sample result (experimental and control condition combined) must follow the product multinomial model:
where
It is now possible to construct a processing tree model of the hindsight bias effect Basically, such a model is a complex restraint on the probabilities p itj that is derived from substantive theoretical considerations. If this restraint proves to be empirically adequate, then a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the psychological validity of the model is fulfilled.
To define a processing tree model of the hindsight bias effect, two more components are needed: (a) a specification of the parameter space &l whose elements represent vectors of probabilities of cognitive processes leading to certain ROJs in both the experimental and the control conditions, and (b) a set of model equations defining a mapping/: XI -• F of the parameter space ft into T, where T denotes the set of possible probability matrices of OJ-CJ-ROJ rank orders, This mapping / specifies how the probabilities p tij of observable OJ-CJ-ROJ rank orders in the experimental and the control conditions depend on the probabilities of the cognitive processes underlying participants' ROJs.
One way to introduce these two components is to define a processing tree diagram that (a) enumerates the cognitive processes assumed to be relevant in generating memory judgments in hindsight bias experiments and (b) delineates all theoretically reasonable sequences of cognitive processes leading to certain OJ-CJ-ROJ rank orders.
Illustration of the Model
Figures 1A and IB illustrate a possible candidate for such a processing tree diagram (first suggested by Erdfelder, 1992) . It is based on the assumption that the probabilities of OJ-CJ-ROJ rank orders can best be explained in terms of four classes of parameters: (a) parameters representing underestimations of the CJ in the OJ during the encoding phase (parameters / c and l E for the control and experimental conditions, respectively), (b) parameters representing OJ recollections in the retrieval phase (parameters r c and r E for the control and experimental conditions, respectively), (c) parameters representing unbiased OJ reconstructions during the retrieval phase (parameters A, g Ut g gh g n , and g g2 ), and (d) parameters representing OJ reconstructions in the retrieval phase that are biased by outcome knowledge (parameters £», c, g 13 , and g g3 ). An overview summarizing the psychological interpretations of the various parameters is presented in Table 2 .
The basic idea underlying the processing trees shown in Figure 1A (control condition) and Figure IB (experimental condition) is that participants prefer a direct-recall strategy in the retrieval stage of hindsight bias experiments. If participants succeed in retrieving the OJ from episodic long-term memory, then the ROJ is equal to the OJ. Reconstruction processes such as anchoring on the current belief and adjustment or rejudgment occur only if participants cannot successfully retrieve the OJ.
3 Recollection and reconstruction processes (including guessing processes) fully 3 Obviously, there is some correspondence between these ideas and prior work of other authors. For example, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) suggested that effects of misleading postevent information can best be explained by assuming that participants first try to recollect the original event, and if they do not succeed, they reconstruct it using the available information (e.g., the misleading information) as a starting point. The possibility of applying their framework to the hindsight bias paradigm has been noted before by Hell et al. (1988, p. 537) and by Stahlberg, Eller, and Frey (1990) . Similarly, as pointed out by one of the reviewers, prior work by Higgins and collaborators (e.g., Higgins & Liberman, 1994; Higgins & Stangor, 1988) suggests that people remember judgments in a format relative to some standard, and if the standard is not recalled at the time of the memory test, then the original judgment is reconstructed using an available new standard instead. 4 It seems possible to construct a model that can account for motivational response adjustments in addition to recollection and reconstruction processes. However, such a model would include even more parameters than the present 13-parameter model, and it would most likely need additional empirical categories to be identifiable. One of our goals was to avoid unnecessarily complex modeling of hindsight bias phenomena, and we therefore built upon the bulk of the literature suggesting no impact or, at most, very weak impact of self-serving motivations on hindsight bias data (cf. Connolly & Bukszar, 1990; Fischhoff, 1977; Hennessey & Edgell, 1991; Leary, 1981 Leary, ,1982 Pohl & Hell, 1996; Stahlberg et al., 1995; Stahlberg, Eller, Romahn, & Frey, 1993; Synodinos, 1986) . Most importantly, the appropriateness of our decision to ignore motivational response adjustments is testable in principle: If any of the model parameters representing recollection and reconstruction processes could be shown to covary with manipulations of self-serving motivations (e.g., by contrasting public versus private contexts when obtaining the ROJs), then the model would need revision. However, given the results cited here, this seems less likely. determine the ROJ. Post hoc modifications of the ROJ-for instance, motivational response adjustments due to the tendency toward a favorable self-presentation-are assumed to be negligible.
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The transfer of the basic idea as outlined in the previous paragraph into a processing tree diagram is rather straightforward. Looking first at the control condition (see Figure 1 A), the primary (i.e., leftmost) level of this tree corresponds to the encoding stage; all subsequent levels represent the retrieval stage of hindsight bias experiments. On the primary level, we distinguish between cases in which an OJ does (with probability / c ) or does not (with probability 1 -/ c ) underestimate the CJ. This distinction is important because the cognitive processes at the retrieval stage need not have equal probabilities for cases with OJ < CJ as opposed to cases with OJ > CJ. There are several reasons why systematic underestimation or overestimation of the CJ during the encoding stage might affect processes in the retrieval stage. First, there is empirical evidence suggesting that the hindsight bias effect may differ in size between Probability of recollecting the original judgment (OJ) for a control item. Probability of recollecting the OJ for a feedback item. Probability of a biased reconstruction given a failure to recollect the OJ. Probability of a source confusion error in case of biased reconstructions. Probability of a chance hit of the OJ (or correct judgment, CJ) in case of unbiased reconstructions. Parameters characterizing the recollection of the original judgment (ROJ) distribution in case of unbiased reconstructions without chance hits (for OJ < CJ and OJ < CJ, respectively). Parameters characterizing the ROJ distribution in case of unbiased reconstructions without chance hits (for OJ < CJ and OJ > CJ, respectively). Parameters characterizing the ROJ distribution in case of biased reconstructions without source confusions (for OJ < CJ and OJ > CJ, respectively). Probability of OJ < CJ for control and experimental items, respectively.
OJ < CJ cases and OJ > CJ cases. For example, a striking asymmetry in the hindsight bias effect for binary CJs has often been observed: True assertions tend to produce larger hindsight bias effects than false assertions (Fischhoff, 1977; Hertwig et al. f 1997) . Second, it is easy to imagine conditions in which at least some retrieval-stage processes may well depend on the rank ordering of OJ and CJ. Responses generated by plain guessing, for instance, could perhaps be independent of the OJ-CJ relation if / c equals .50. However, if I c is small (e.g., .10) it is implausible to assume that the event ROJ < CJ, given OJ < CJ, is as likely to result from pure guessing as the corresponding result ROJ > CJ, given OJ > CJ. This prediction follows from the reasoning that pure guessing can be modeled as the drawing of a "random ROJ" from the same distribution from which the OJ was drawn. If this assumption is at least approximately correct and / c = p(OJ <CJ) = . 10, then the event ROJ > CJ, given OJ > CJ, can be expected to be more likely the result of guessing than the event ROJ < CJ, given OJ < CJ.
Although the values of some of the parameters may depend on the relation between OJ and CJ (i.e., on whether the OJ underestimates or overestimates the CJ), the basic structure of possible sequences of cognitive processes during retrieval is assumed to be independent of events during encoding. Therefore, we explicate in some detail only the processing tree's upper half, which corresponds to underestimations of the CJ by the OJ. As outlined above, we assume that in the retrieval phase, participants try a directrecall strategy first. In the control condition, this strategy leads to a successful recollection with probability r c , implying the observable rank order ROJ = OJ < CJ. With probability 1 -r c , however, this strategy is assumed to fail, and some reconstruction strategy becomes necessary (e.g., plain guessing, rejudgment, or anchoring on the current belief and adjustment). Obviously, the reconstruction process cannot be biased by CJ knowledge in the control condition, irrespective of the specific strategy selected by the participant. This means that the parameters characterizing the distribution of possible results of the reconstruction process (i.e., h, g n , and g ]2 ) reflect unbiased reconstructions.
We may observe a "chance hit" of the OJ with probability h. In this case, we can again observe the rank order ROJ = OJ < CJ. Because unbiased reconstructions should not favor either ROJ = OJ or ROJ = CJ, the same probability h applies to a chance hit of the CJ. One might expect A to be rather small if the set of possible response alternatives is large. Thus, unbiased reconstruction processes may frequently (i.e., with probability 1 -2h) result in some ROJ that is different from both OJ and CJ. For these cases, g n denotes the probability that the reconstruction results in an ROJ that is smaller than the CJ, and g a denotes the probability that the ROJ is smaller than the OJ, resulting in the observable rank order ROJ <OJ< CJ.
Exactly the same description applies to the lower half of the processing tree in Figure 1A , which represents retrieval processes underlying the ROJs for OJs that represent overestimations of the CJs. Note, however, that whereas r c and h are assumed to be independent of under-or overestimations during the encoding stage, the parameters g gi and g# may differ from the corresponding probabilities g u and g& for underestimations. Thus, as outlined above, the relation between CJ and OJ may influence unbiased reconstruction processes, which in turn may affect the magnitude of the hindsight bias effect differently.
The part of the model referring to cognitive processes in the experimental condition (see Figure IB ) has much the same structure as the process model for the control condition. However, there are two important differences between the trees shown in Figures 1A and IB. First, the probability r E of successful recollections of the OJ in the experimental condition may differ from the corresponding probability r c in the control condition. This makes it possible to measure memory impairments in hindsight bias experiments: If r B < r c , then a negative recollection bias due to the CJ presentation is demonstrated. Negative recollection biases are implied by theories that attribute the hindsight bias effect either to distorting effects of the CJ presentation on the memory trace of the OJ or to interference of the CJ with the accessibility of this trace. Positive recollection biases, that is, memory-enhancing effects of the CJ presentation resulting in positive r E -r c differences, are also possible in principle, albeit unexpected in light of existing hindsight bias theories. Finally, if r E = r c , then the absence of recollection biases is demonstrated; that is, neither the trace of the OJ nor its accessibility has been affected by the CJ presentation.
A second important difference between the processing trees depicted in Figures 1A and IB concerns the reconstruction processes implied by failures of the direct-recall strategy. By definition, reconstruction processes must be unbiased in the control condition. In the experimental condition, however, reconstructions may be biased by the CJ presentation (with probability b) or unbiased (with probability 1 -b). If reconstructions are unbiased in spite of the CJ presentation, then exactly the same distribution of ROJs will result as in cases of nonrecollected OJs to control items. Biased reconstructions, in contrast, will result in an ROJ that deviates from the OJ toward the CJ. With probability c, biased reconstructions may be "source confusions" so that ROJ -CJ. If no source-confusion error occurs, g B denotes the probability of biased reconstructions felling between OJ and CJ, given OJ < CJ. Again, for reasons already outlined above, this probability may deviate from the corresponding probability g#, characterizing biased reconstructions of overestimated OJs.
Whereas the r E ~ r c difference is a measure of recollection bias, the parameter b is a measure of reconstruction biases induced by the CJ presentation. If b = 0, then none of the possible reconstruction processes has been biased by the CJ presentation. This would be inconsistent with either an anchoringand-adjustment or a rejudgment explanation of the hindsight bias effect as outlined by Hawkins andHastie (1990) . In contrast, b > 0 would indicate that at least one component of the reconstruction process was influenced by the CJ presentation.
There is another difference between the trees shown in Figures 1A and IB that needs to be mentioned: To provide for the possibility that the model can be applied not only to randomized experiments but also to nonrandomized studies, the probability of a CJ underestimation in the OJ is allowed to differ between the experimental (/ E ) and the control condition (Z c ). Of course, l E = l c should hold for truly randomized hindsight bias experiments, because no systematic influences favoring underestimation in either condition should then be present.
Parameter Space and Model Equations
Because each of the 13 model parameters, / c , / E , r c , r E , h , g\u ggi, gn , g S 2, b, c, & 3 , and g#, denotes a probability and, thus, some element of the interval [0,1], the parameter space of the proposed model is
Model equations may be derived by first computing the probabilities of the events corresponding to single branches in the processing trees shown in Figures 1A and IB. The probability of such an event is simply the product of all (conditional) link probabilities of the branch leading to that event. For example, the probability of the rank order ROJ = OJ < CJ as a result of the processes specified in the uppermost branch in Figure 1A is / c X r c . The events corresponding to different branches are disjoint. Therefore, the unconditional probability of an observable rank order is the sum of the probabilities of all branches leading to this particular rank order. For example, there are two branches leading to the observable rank order ROJ = OJ < CJ in the control condition, namely the uppermost and the third branch in Figure 1A . Adding up the corresponding branch probabilities, we arrive at the model equation p(ROJ= OJ<CJ) = p(C 2 ) = P12 = lc X r c + / c X (1 -r c ) X 2/i X .5 = lc X (r c + [1 -r c ] X h). Model equations for the remaining 19 rank order categories (9 for the control condition and 10 for the experimental condition) may be derived analogously. Tney arc summarized in Table 3 .
Inserting these 20 model equations into Equations 1 and 2 yields a multinomial processing tree model for the hindsight bias (HB) paradigm. We refer to this model as the HB 13 model. More restrictive submodels of this 13-parameter model can be deduced quite easily. Each member of this family shares the basic assumptions with the HB 13 model, but the restrictions make each submodel more parsimonious and allow for additional interpretations. For example, one may impose the equality constraint that / c = / E , yielding the 12-parameter model HB 12, which includes only one / parameter instead of two. If this submodel fits the data we may conclude that the control and experimental conditions do not differ substantially with respect to the OJ-CJ relations. One may also be interested in testing whether the distribution of reconstructed ROJs is unaffected by under-or overestimations at the encoding stage. In this case, we would impose the restrictions g u = g %u g l2 = # g2 , and g l3 -g g3 on the HB 13 model, arriving at the 10-parameter model HB 10. If we combine this HB 10 model with the restriction that IQ -l E , a 9-parameter model HB 9 results. Adding the assumption that l c = l E -.5, we may define an even more restrictive model, HB 8.
From the perspective of model parsimony, HB 10 and its submodels are rather interesting candidates. Given that the restrictions g n -g gU g i2 = g# $ and g a = g& hold true, and given that one is not particularly interested in estimating / c and / E , we may conclude that whether the OJs represent overestimates or underestimates of the CJs is not only irrelevant with respect to the g parameters of the model but can also be ignored in the definition of the OJ-CJ-ROJ rank order categories to which the model refers. A simpler model based on only five empirical categories for each condition could then be used to estimate the core parameters r c , r E , and b, among others. We return to this issue in the General Discussion section.
Of course, each model of this HB model family may also be restricted in other ways, for example, by adding the restriction r c = r E (to test tie hypothesis that no recollection bias exists) or by adding the parameter fixation b = 0 (to test the hypothesis that no reconstruction bias exists). Which restriction is considered adequate depends on the substantive hypothesis under investigation.
Statistical Analysis
Provided that all parameters are elements of the open interval (0,1), the HB 13 model and its submodels can be shown to be globally identifiable; that is, different vectors of parameter values are never mapped onto the same matrix P of rank order probabilities (P E T). Hence, the parameter values are uniquely determined by P, and standard methods 
HB = hindsight bias; Ci-C] 0 = control item categories; Ei-iiio = feedback item categories; ROJ -recollection of the original judgment; OJ = original judgment; CJ = correct judgment.
of parameter estimation (e.g., the maximum likelihood method) and goodness-of-fit testing (e.g., likelihood-ratio tests) can be applied to any set of sample frequencies Y it j. The general multinomial model in Equation 2 contains 2 X (10 -1) = 18 free parameters/?^. Therefore, the goodnessof-fit test for any of the HB models mentioned above always has df ~ 18 -5 degrees of freedom, where S denotes the number of free parameters in the HB model. For instance, the HB 13 model test has 18 -13 = 5 degrees of freedom.
Fortunately, it is not necessary to derive the modelspecific estimation and evaluation equations because, after appropriate reparameterizarion, 5 the HB 13 model turns out to be a general processing tree (GPT) model as defined and statistically analyzed by Hu and Batchelder (1994) . These authors presented methods of parameter estimation and goodness-of-fit testing (implemented in the MBT (multinomial binary tree) program by Hu, 1993) that are applicable to all GPT models. Therefore, it was possible to perform the statistical analyses reported below by applying the MBT program to the reparameterized HB 13 model equations corresponding to the rows of Table 3 . Parameters were estimated using the maximum likelihood method, and goodness-of-fit tests were performed using the likelihood ratio x 2 statistic G 2 .
Validity of the HB 13 Model
We now turn to the question of the psychological validity of the HB 13 model. "Die validity test has two components. First, the model must fit the data from typical hindsight bias experiments. Second, if the psychological interpretation of the model parameters is adequate, we should be able to specify experimental manipulations that selectively influence some parameters but not others. For instance, parameters that are assumed to represent recollections of OJs (i.e., r c and r E ) should vary as a function of OJ retrievability, but not as a function of response bias. We conducted four experiments in which we focused on both of these components of validity tests.
Overview of the Present Experiments
All experiments used the same type of materials. Participants were asked to provide answers to almanac questions that were relatively difficult, thus minimizing the frequency of OJ = CJ events. For instance, participants were asked What is the melting temperature of lead? Following an interval of varying length, participants were informed about the correct answers to half of the questions. For instance, they were told that The melting temperature of lead is 328° C. The other half of the questions served as control items. Thus, as in most hindsight bias experiments, the outcome information was always manipulated within sub- 5 The link probability (1 -2ft) occurs in several of the HB 13 model equations (see Table 3 ). It is inconsistent with the requirement that GPT link probabilities need to be monomials in the model's parameters and their complements (see Hu & Batchelder, 1994, p. 24 , Equations 2 and 5). However, using the parameter h' t= 2ft instead of the parameter ft, our HB model conforms to this constraint and thus to the class of GPT models.
ject. Finally, participants were asked to remember, as well as they could, their OJs.
Following the goals outlined in the introduction of this section, the experiments were designed to provide a solid basis for judging whether the HB 13 model adequately describes the empirical facts under a variety of different conditions. This question is answered by analyzing separately the model's global fit to the data of each experiment In addition, and on a more fine-grained level, each experiment was designed to manipulate a different cognitive process involved in the hindsight bias phenomenon. The manipulation should show up in the corresponding model parameters if our model is to be accepted as valid.
In Experiment 1, our goal was to affect the recollection parameters r c and r E , but no other parameters, by contrasting items whose OJs were or were not retrieved successfully earlier. Experiment 2 was designed to affect selectively the reconstruction bias parameter b by manipulating the delay between CJ feedback and the memory test. In Experiment 3, we replicated the result of Hasher et al. (1981, Experiment 2) that discrediting the CJ reduces the hindsight bias. According to Hasher et al., the CJ invalidation should improve access to the OJs and thus increase the recollection parameter r E for feedback items. Finally, Experiment 4 manipulated the guessing parameter h by contrasting recognition tests with different numbers of response alternatives.
Data Analysis
We conducted, for the data from each experiment, a preliminary analysis of variance (ANOVA) with a typical index of the magnitude of hindsight bias as the dependent variable to examine whether the usual effect is present if the data are analyzed in conventional ways. As a measure of the hindsight bias, we used the index
proposed by Hell et al. (1988) . The multinomial model analyses, however, were based on the raw frequencies Y fJ . For all tests of statistical significance, a has been set at .05, and individual p values are therefore not reported. For statistically significant F tests, we report partial Rh (R*) as a measure of relative effect size, that is, the proportion of variance explained by the effect relative to the total variance not explained by other experimental variables (Cohen, 1977, p. 412) . A multivariate approach was used for the withinsubject effects (O'Brien & Kaiser, 1985) . As a consequence, no MSE values are reported for within-subject variables with more than two levels.
For each experiment, an initial analysis had revealed that which of two item sets was used for the experimental and control items had no effect, nor did this variable interact with any of the other independent variables. Therefore, this control variable has been omitted from all analyses reported, for greater clarity in presenting the results.
Experiment 1
As already outlined above, Experiment 1 was designed to manipulate the memory parameters r c and r E simultaneously and exclusively. For half of the experimental items and for half of the control items, participants were asked to recall their OJs immediately after they had provided these for the first time. For the other half of the control items and the experimental items, participants did not have to recall their OJs until the final test after 1.5 hr. We predicted that items whose OJs were successfully recalled initially would receive larger r c and r E parameters in the final recall test, whereas items whose OJs could not be recalled initially would receive smaller parameter values as compared with the item set without initial retrieval instruction (see also Bjork, 1975) . We also predicted that other HB 13 model parameters would not differ between the initial recall conditions.
Method Participants
Participants were 26 female and 5 male undergraduate students at the University of Bonn who volunteered to participate in the experiment They ranged in age from 20 to 34 years {M = 23.0, SD = 3.2).
Materials
The OJ questionnaire. A total of 56 almanac questions were presented to participants in the form of a questionnaire. All questions required numerical responses. Hie appropriate unit of the numerical judgment was always provided. For instance, when asked What is the distance between London and New York City ? the task was to respond in kilometers, and km was printed where the answer was to be placed on the questionnaire. All almanac questions were such that we could expect participants not to know the precise answer.
The CJ feedback sheet The 56 almanac questions were divided at random into two sets of 28. Participants received feedback about the correct judgment for only one of the two sets. For half of the participants in each of the two experimental groups, feedback was given for Set 1 questions (the experimental items), whereas Set 2 questions served as control items. The other half of the participants in each experimental group received feedback for Set 2 questions, whereas Set 1 questions served as control items.
On the CJ feedback sheet, the original questions were simply transformed into statements providing the answer. For instance, the correct judgment to What is the distance between London and New York City? was presented as The distance between London and New York City is 5,536 km.
The ROJ questionnaire. The ROJ questionnaire was identical to the OJ questionnaire except that participants were asked to recall their OJs rather than to answer the questions. To emphasize this point, the instruction to recall the OJ rather than to provide an appropriate answer was printed below each question.
Procedure
All participants were tested simultaneously in a large room. They were seated such that they could not see each other's judgments. The OJ questionnaire was described as a general knowledge test. Note. OJ = original judgment; CJ = correct judgment; ROJ = recollection of the original judgment. The numbers correspond to the number of items in each phase of the experiment and are reported separately for each condition.
Participants were asked to write down what they thought to be the appropriate answer to each individual question, estimating the correct numeric solution if necessary. Answering the questions was self-paced. In all phases of the experiment, the questionnaires were collected after all participants had indicated that they had answered all questions. Immediately after having completed the OJ questionnaire, participants received the recall questionnaire. The question format was identical to the standard ROJ questionnaire. A total of 28 answers were to be recalled, 14 of which were control items and 14 of which were experimental items. Thus, each participant contributed 14 responses in each of the following categories: experimental item/immediate recall required, experimental item/no immediate recall required, control item/immediate recall required, control item/no immediate recall required.
After a 1.5-hr retention interval, participants received feedback about the CJs for half of the original questions (i.e., the experimental items). Participants were instructed to study these CJs carefully. After 10 min, the CJ feedback sheets were collected, and the ROJ questionnaire was administered. All participants were told that their task was to recall, as well as possible, the answers they had given on the OJ questionnaire. They were encouraged to ignore the CJs when trying to recall their original answers. The entire procedure for this experiment is illustrated in Table 4 . After the experiment, all participants were debriefed and the purpose of the experiment was described.
Design
The independent variables were (a) whether the CJ was or was not provided for a particular question (item type, within subject) and (b) whether recall was not required, was required and successful, or was required but not successful (within subject). Thus, the experiment was based on a 2 x 3 design.
Results and Discussion
Preliminary Analysis
When required to recall immediately their responses to a subset of the almanac questions, some participants either recalled very little or most of their original answers, resulting in very few data points for certain treatment combinations. Therefore, mean hindsight bias indices (cf. Equation 5) were computed instead of using the median as a measure of central tendency (Miller, 1988) . To compensate for extreme values in the HB index, all values HB ^ -250 and HB > 250 were excluded from the computations of these means. Initially, the means of these truncated HB indices were calculated for each participant and for each of the 2 X 3 item types separately, resulting in six global HB measures per participant, one for each condition. These global HB measures served as raw data for a subsequent repeated measures multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA).
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Figure 2 presents the mean truncated HB indices per condition averaged across subjects. The 2X3 MANOVA with item type (control vs. experimental items) and recall status (recall not required vs. recall successful vs. recall not successful) as within-subject variable on participants' HB measures revealed a significant main effect of item type, F(l, 29) = 8.10, MSE = 282.71, R 2 p = .22, a significant main effect of recall status, F(2,28) = 3.95,/?p = 37,andno significant interaction (F < 1). Thus, from this perspective, there appears to be an equal amount of hindsight bias (i.e., experimental-control difference) for all three recall conditions.
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Model Tests
All model tests and parameter estimations referring to HB 13 and its submodels were performed using the full set of all 6 We refer to this analysis as a repeated measures MANOVA rather than ANOVA because we used the multivariate F test based on the Pillai-Bartlett V criterion for the within-subject main effect and the interaction (cf. O'Brien & Kaiser, 1985) . 7 An interesting effect, evident not only in Experiment 1, is that the mean HB index tends to be larger than zero for both experimental and control items. The larger-than-zero hindsight bias in the control condition is typical for studies using other global bias measures as well. To our knowledge, Vorberg (1991) was the first to propose a simple statistical explanation for this phenomenon. Typically, the OJ distribution will be unimodal and approximately symmetric with a mean that deviates only somewhat from the CJ. To the degree to which unbiased reconstructions can be conceived of as drawing a random ROJ from the same distribution from which the OJ was drawn, the ROJ will tend to deviate from the OJ toward the mean and, thus, toward the CJ. This argument is, of course, an application of the familiar regression-toward-the-mean phenomenon to hindsight judgments. As a consequence, a mean HB index larger than zero is not sufficient for establishing a hindsight bias effect. Systematic biases due to the feedback information are established only if the mean HB index for feedback items exceeds the mean HB index for control items. 31 X 56 data points (i.e.. Participants X Items) except those rare cases in which the OJ matched the CJ perfectly (1.55% of 1,736 OJs). These cases were discarded from all further statistical analyses. The HB 13 model tests are summarized in Table 5 , and Figure 3 illustrates the parameter estimates for the central parameters of the model, including the 95% confidence intervals. The raw frequencies underlying these model tests are shown in the Experiment 1 section of the Appendix. 8 The first statistical test concerned the model's global fit to the data from all three recall conditions. It is clear from the first row of data in Table 5 that the HB 13 model is compatible with the data of the entire experiment, and the fit for each recall condition separately is also excellent (see the secondto-last row of data). All these G 2 goodness-of-fit statistics are clearly less than the critical x 2 values for the 5% level of significance, and they are close to the degrees of freedom (df&) of the tests that are the expected values of the statistics in the case that the model holds true. 8 For some rank order categories, we observed zero sample frequencies in Experiments 1, 2, and 3. This is a problem because the G 2 goodness-of-fit statistics used in our statistical tests are not defined whenever one or more category frequencies are zero. The version of Hu's (1993) MBT program that we used in our statistical analyses solves this problem by replacing zero frequencies with 0.1. Of course, this is a relatively arbitrary procedure, and we therefore evaluated its impact on the results. Fortunately, the The next interesting aspect of the results is the behavior of the recollection parameters for control items and for experimental items, r c and r E . Our goal was to manipulate simultaneously how well participants recollected their OJs to both control and experimental items. Figure 3 illustrates that this manipulation was successful. The estimates of the recollection parameters ^ an^ r E are largest for OJs that participants had successfully recalled immediately after they had provided these judgments for the first time in the experiment. In contrast, r c and f E are smallest for OJs that participants had forgotten within a few minutes. For those items for which no recall was required, t c and r E fall numerically in between the two other estimates. As Table 5 shows, both r c and r E differ significantly between conditions. No other parameters of the model vary as a function of our recall manipulations. Thus, all model parameters exhibit the expected behavior.
In addition, the model-based results reveal why two main effects and no interaction effect cropped up in the mean HB indices. First, both experimental and control OJs were recollected better following initial successful retrieval, thus reducing the global HB measures and thereby producing a significant recall condition main effect. Second, recollection biases appear to have played no role in the item type main effect because the null hypothesis r c -r E could be retained for all three recall conditions (see the last row of data in Table 5 ). Thus, the hindsight bias effect reflected in the global HB indices seems to result from nothing but reconstruction biases as measured by b. Third, the lack of an interaction between recall condition and item type is a consequence of the fact that b does not differ between recall pattern of results was not severely affected by choosing other possible procedures (e.g., adding 1 to each cell frequency) or by choosing other goodness-of-fit statistics (e.g., Pearson's statistic). The method chosen in this article tends to increase the goodnessof-fit statistics slightly as compared with the other methods mentioned above.
conditions (see Table 5 ): When recollection biases do not exist and reconstruction biases are constant across recall conditions, no interaction effect can show up in the global HB measures.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to influence selectively how much participants are biased by the CJ when trying to reconstruct their OJs. One group of participants provided their ROJs with the information about the correct answers present on the response sheet. Thus, the CJ for this group was much more salient than for the other group, which had the CJ feedback sheets removed before the ROJs were required. We expected that this manipulation would influence the process of reconstructing the OJs, given a recollection failure. With the CJ present on the response sheets, participants should have been more likely to use this information in their anchor-and-adjustment or rejudgment processes than if the CJ information was not readily available. In terms of our HB 13 model, parameter b reflects how much the reconstructed ROJ responses are biased by the CJs. Thus, our manipulation should influence parameter b. More precisely, b should be larger when the CJ was present at the time of ROJ generation, and b should be smaller when the ROJ was absent.
In contrast, the CJ timing manipulation should not have influenced any of the other parameters of the model. For instance, we did not expect an effect on how well participants recollected their OJs for either the experimental or the control items because (a) the total length of the retention interval was constant across conditions and (b) the retrievability of the OJ was not likely to have been affected by the CJ-present versus CJ-removed manipulation. Despite the CJs being reasonable starting points in reconstructing nonrecollected OJs, we assumed that participants with the CJs present on the response sheet would tend to ignore them while trying to recollect their OJs, because they would know that the CJs could operate as inappropriate retrieval cues that would misguide their attempts to retrieve their OJs (in fact, this was reinforced by the instructions). In essence, therefore, OJ recollections for the control items without CJs on the response sheet should not differ substantially from the recollections for the experimental items for which the CJs were ignored. On the basis of the findings of Experiment 1, the same result was expected for the CJ-removed condition.
Method Participants
Participants were 21 female and 11 male undergraduate students at the University of Bonn who received course credit for participating in the experiment. They ranged in age from 20 to 43 years (M = 24.7, SD = 4.5). The participants were assigned at random to one of the two experimental conditions, the interpolated-feedback condition (17 participants) and the simultaneous-feedback condition (15 participants).
Materials
The OJ questionnaire, the CJ feedback sheet, and the ROJ questionnaire were identical to those of Experiment 1 except that they contained only 54 almanac questions and answers, divided at random into two sets of 27. Participants received feedback about the correct judgments for only one of the two sets. For half of the participants in each of the two experimental groups, feedback was given for Set 1 questions (the experimental items), whereas Set 2 questions served as control items. The other half of the participants in each experimental group received feedback for Set 2 questions, whereas Set 1 questions served as control items.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1, with the exception that participants did not receive an initial recall instruction directly after having completed the OJ questionnaire. Also, after a 1.5-hr retention interval, participants in the interpolated-feedback group, but not participants in the simultaneousfeedback group, received feedback about the CJs for half of the original questions (i.e., for the experimental items). Participants were instructed to study these CJs carefully. After 10 min, the CJ feedback sheets were collected, and the ROJ questionnaire was administered to all participants. The ROJ questionnaire of the simultaneous-feedback group, but not that of the interpolatedfeedback group, also contained the CJs for the experimental items.
All participants were told that their task was to recall, as well as possible, the answers they had given on the OJ questionnaire. They were encouraged to ignore the CJs when trying to recall their OJs. After the experiment, all participants were debriefed, and the purpose of the experiment was described.
Design
Independent variables were (a) whether the correct judgment was or was not provided for a particular question (item type, within subject) and (b) whether participants received the CJ feedback simultaneously with the ROJ questionnaire or whether the CJ feedback was interpolated between the OJ questionnaire and the ROJ questionnaire (feedback timing, between subjects). Thus, the experiment was based on a 2 x 2 design.
Results and Discussion
Preliminary Analysis
For each participant, the medians of the 27 control item HB indices and the 27 experimental item HB indices were calculated. Medians were preferred to the means used in Experiment 1 for two reasons. First, we had more items per item category in Experiment 2, and 27 items seemed a solid basis for estimating a median. Second, medians are robust statistics, that is, resistant against outliers. Thus, the truncation procedure used in Experiment 1 could be avoided here, and all 27 HB indices entered into the calculation of the medians, regardless of their size. Figure 4 presents the median hindsight bias indices averaged across participants. A 2 X 2 ANOVA with item type (control vs. experimental items) as a within-subject variable and feedback timing (simultaneous vs. interpolated) as a between-subjects variable on participants' median hindsight bias values revealed a significant main effect of item type, f(l, 29) = 6.31, MSE = 5.27, R 2 ? = .18, a significant main effect of feedback timing, F(l, 29) = 4.57, MSE = 12.26, i?p = .14, and no significant interaction, F(l, 29) = 2.58. Thus, the experiment demonstrated the presence of the typical hindsight bias effect which, according to this analysis, did not vary as a function of whether participants received the feedback about the CJ before the ROJ questionnaire or simultaneously with it. However, hindsight bias values were generally larger for the simultaneous-than for the interpolated-feedback condition.
Model Tests
The model tests are summarized in Table 6 , and Figure 5 illustrates the parameter estimates for the central parameters of the model. The raw frequencies underlying these model tests are shown in the Experiment 2 section of the Appendix. All 32 X 54 data points entered into these raw frequencies except those cases in which the OJ matched the CJ (1.67% of 1,728 OJs).
The first statistical test concerned the model's global fit to the data. Clearly, the HB 13 model fits the data of the entire experiment (see the first row of data in Table 6 ). The picture is somewhat different if we perform the same analyses separately for each experimental condition. The HB 13 model is not completely compatible with the data for the interpolated-feedback group, but it is compatible with the data for the simultaneous-feedback group (see the second-tolast row of data in Table 6 ). We return to these results in the General Discussion section.
As is obvious from Figure 5 , the CJ timing manipulation had the intended effect. The estimate b appears substantially larger for the simultaneous-feedback group than for the interpolated-feedback group. This is consistent with our predictions. Table 6 shows that the group difference in b is indeed statistically significant because a restricted model assuming that b is numerically identical in both groups does not fit the data. In addition, the groups do not differ significantly with respect to any of the other parameters, r c , r E , c, and h. Moreover, as already observed in Experiment 1, recollection biases appear to have played no role: The G 2 statistics testing the hypothesis r c = r E are far from being significant in both groups (see the last row of data in Table  6 ). Thus, the hindsight bias effect again seems to be a consequence of reconstruction biases for nonrecollected OJs only. In contrast to Experiment 1, however, parameter b differs significantly between groups, and one should therefore expect a larger experimental-control difference in the global HB indices for the simultaneous-feedback group as compared with the interpolated-feedback group. Although the descriptive pattern of results fits this prediction (see Figure 4) , the statistical interaction test failed to be significant. Hence, at least in this experiment, the analyses based on the HB 13 model appear to be more sensitive to treatment effects than the general linear model analyses of global HB indices traditionally used in hindsight bias research.
Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 used simple treatments with obvious psychological effects to test whether these effects are mirrored in the core parameters r c , r E , and b appropriately. Experiment 3 followed a different logic. It served three purposes. First, to give recollection biases a greater chance, we used a 1-week retention interval between OJ and ROJ, rather than the 1.5-hr interval of Experiments 1 and 2. According the relative-trace-strength hypothesis suggested by Hell et al. (1988) , memory impairments should be more likely when the memory trace strength of the OJ is weak compared with the trace strength of the CJ. Second, we aimed at replicating a finding that is important for hindsight bias research in general and, to our knowledge, has not been replicated before. Third, we wanted to test whether the explanation of this finding provided by its originators is consistent with results based on the HB 13 model. More specifically, we used a manipulation introduced by Hasher et al. (1981) to reduce the overall hindsight bias. Attempts at reducing or eliminating the hindsight bias were often unsuccessful (cf. Fischhoff, 1977; Pohl & Hell, 1996) . In Hasher et al.'s Experiment 2, however, the CJs were successfully disconfirmed by telling participants that the answers they had received on the feedback sheet had been wrong. This manipulation effectively reduced the hindsight bias effect so that it failed to be significant even at the a = .10 level. Hasher et al. interpreted this finding as showing that "subjects can, under some circumstances, gain access to their original knowledge" (p. 93). If this interpretation was correct, then discrediting the CJs should, in terms of the HB 13 model, selectively affect the recollection of the OJs for experimental items and, hence, should affect parameter r E . In other words, parameter r E should be higher when the CJs are discredited than when they are not. However, it seems possible that discrediting the CJs could also reduce the hindsight bias by discouraging participants from using the CJ to reconstruct the OJ in situations in which the OJ cannot be recollected. In this case, the estimate of parameter b should be lower when the CJs are discredited than when they are not discredited. Experiment 3 was designed to test these hypotheses.
Method Participants
Participants were 47 female and 19 male undergraduate students at the University of Bonn who received course credit for participating in the experiment. They ranged in age from 18 to 30 years (M= 22.1, SD = 3.2). The participants were assigned at random to one of the two experimental conditions, the CJ-discredited condition (35 participants) and the standard-feedback condition (31 participants).
Materials
The OJ questionnaire, the CJ feedback sheet, and the ROJ questionnaire were identical to those used in Experiment 2, except that two items were added to the OJ questionnaire for which false feedback was provided in the CJ feedback sheet. These items were used to support the experimenter's (false) statement that all correct judgments on the CJ feedback sheet had in fact been completely wrong. However, the CJs were discredited only for participants in the CJ-discredited group and not for participants in the standardfeedback group, who received standard instructions with the CJ feedback.
Again, half of the participants in each of the two experimental groups received feedback for the 27 Set 1 questions (the experimental items) plus the 2 false-feedback items, whereas Set 2 questions served as control items. The other half of the participants in each experimental group received feedback for the 27 Set 2 questions (the experimental items) plus the 2 false-feedback items, whereas Set 1 questions served as control items. Both false-feedback items were used only as examples in the discrediting instructions given to CJ-discredited group. These items were not included in the ROJ questionnaire.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 2, with the following exceptions: Exactly 1 week after participants had filled out the OJ questionnaire, all participants received the same feedback about the CJs for one set of 27 original questions (i.e., for the experimental items) as well as for the 2 false-feedback items. The CJs were printed on a separate sheet. Participants were 
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Item Type Figure 6 . Mean hindsight bias indices as a function of (a) whether the CJ (correct judgment) was or was not provided for a particular question, and (b) whether participants received standard feedback or whether the CJs were discredited before the ROJ (recollection of the original judgment) questionnaire was administered.
instructed to study these CJs carefully. After 10 min, the CJ feedback sheets were collected. Participants in the CJ-discredited group received the following instructions before trying to recall their original answers (English translation):
Before we will continue with this experiment, we must confess to you that all the supposedly 'correct answers* you have read were actually wrong. For instance, the Eiffel tower is, of course, not 150 m, but rattier 300 m high. Also, the Greek mathematician Archimedes obviously was not born in 537 BC but rather in 287 BC, and so on. We gave you this false feedback simply in order to find out how much people are distracted by false feedback in recalling their own answers. There also exists a different group of participants which serves as the experimental group. These participants were not informed about the incorrectness of the answers. You, in contrast, will serve as the informed control group.
By looking at your responses to the following questionnaire we want to see how well you can ignore the false answers you have just read when trying to recall your original answers to the same questions one week ago. We want you to answer the following questions exactly as you did one week ago, ignoring the incorrect answers you have just read.
Participants in the standard-feedback group received the following instructions before recalling their original answers:
By looking at your responses to the following questionnaire we want to see how well you can recall your original answers to the same questions one week ago. We want you to answer the following questions exactly as you did one week ago.
Next, all participants were given the ROJ questionnaire to write down the answers they had given on the OJ questionnaire. After the experiment, all participants were debriefed, and the purpose of the experiment was described.
Design
Independent variables were (a) whether the CJ was or was not provided for a particular question (item type, within subject) and (b) whether participants received standard feedback or whether the CJs were discredited before the ROJ questionnaire was administered (CJ status, between subjects).
Results and Discussion
Preliminary Analysis
As in Experiment 2, the medians of each participant's HB indices were calculated separately for control items and experimental items. Figure 6 presents the median hindsight bias indices averaged across subjects. A 2 X 2 ANOVA with item type (control vs. experimental items) as a withinsubject variable and CJ status (CJ discredited vs. standard feedback) as a between-subjects variable on participants' median hindsight bias values revealed a significant main effectofitemtype,F(l,64) = 50.77, MSE = 284.39, /?* = .44 >a significant main effect of CJ status, F(l, 64) = 9.76, MSE = 379.43, /?p = .13, and a significant interaction between these variables, F(l, 64) = 15.11, MSE = 284.39, R 2 p = .19. Thus, the experiment demonstrated a clear hindsight bias effect that was considerably reduced when the CJs were discredited as wrong and potentially misleading. This result conceptually replicates the findings of Hasher et al. (1981) . The model tests can now inform us of whether this global effect is due to recollection processes as hypothesized by Hasher et al., or whether reconstruction processes were also affected by the manipulation.
Model Tests
The model tests are summarized in Table 7 , and Figure 7 illustrates the parameter estimates for the central parameters of the model. The raw frequencies underlying these model tests are shown in the Experiment 3 section of the Appendix. All 66 X 54 data points entered into these raw frequencies except those cases in which either the OJ matched the CJ or the participants did not provide the ROJ (3.05% of 3,564 OJs). As in the previous experiments, the first statistical test concerned the model's global fit to the data. The first row of data in Table 7 shows that the HB 13 model clearly fits the data of the entire experiment. The same analyses calculated separately for each experimental condition yielded identical results: The HB 13 model is compatible with the data from both the standard-feedback group and the CJ-discredited group.
The data illustrated in Figure 7 might appear to indicate that both groups not only differed with respect to the memory parameter r E , which was expected following the interpretations of Hasher et al. (1981) , but also with respect to the bias parameter b, which would indicate that in addition to gaining a better access to the memory for the OJs, participants were less likely to use a discredited CJ to reconstruct an OJ when that OJ could not be recollected. However, the confidence intervals for b are relatively large. A formal test of whether r E and b differ between the standard-feedback group and the CJ-discredited group yielded that only the estimates of r E , and not those of b or any of the other parameters, differ significantly between the groups (see Table 7 ). This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the hindsight bias was reduced because participants in the CJ-discredited group were in fact better at recollecting their OJs when they believed that the CJ was wrong, which was to be expected according to the original interpretation of Hasher et al.'s (1981) results. 9 In addition, our results indicate that there may also be an effect of discrediting the CJs on the reconstruction bias parameter fc, but this effect did not turn out to be statistically significant in our data.
In contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, we observed a small but significant recollection bias (i.e., r c > r E ) in the standardfeedback group, which was probably due to the longer retention interval. No significant recollection bias showed up in the CJ-disconfirmed group. Thus, the significant interaction effect observed at the level of global HB indices appears to have been due primarily to a reduction in recollection biases caused by disclaiming the CJ. In addition, a reduction of reconstruction biases as measured by b> although not significant when analyzed in isolation, may also have been involved.
Experiment 4
In this final experiment, we wanted to manipulate the model's guessing parameter h. For almanac questions such as the ones used in the present experiments, guessing is not normally a problem. Chances of correctly answering one of the typical numerical questions are rather low. This is mirrored by the almost negligibly low values for the estimates of h in the previous three experiments (see Figures  3, 5, and 7) . However, in situations with a restricted set of response alternatives (e.g., questions that require a binary decision such as true or false, or estimates of the likelihood of events with a fixed set of rating scale alternatives), guessing is a quite relevant process. This is the case not because guessing would be a particularly interesting cognitive process, but rather because guessing behavior that is not adequately taken into account by a model may contaminate other, more central model parameters (cf. Buchner et al., 1995). Thus, for our processing tree model to be applicable to a wide range of experimental results, it must handle situations with elevated guessing probabilities without contaminating the other parameters.
We restricted the number of response alternatives for the almanac questions by changing the response format from open numerical judgments to multiple choice judgments. We had two groups which differed with respect to the number of response alternatives on the ROJ questionnaire. For one group of participants, the multiple choice questionnaire contained 5 response alternatives; for the other group, it contained 10. Consequently, h should be higher for the 5-alternative forced-choice (AFC) group than for the 10-AFC group. More precisely, h, the probability of successfully guessing the correct answer, should be about twice as high for the 5-AFC group as for the 10-AFC group.
Method Participants
Participants were 22 female and 5 male undergraduate students at die Univeisity of Leipzig who received course credit for participating in the experiment They ranged in age from 19 to 29 years (M -22.6, SD = 2.9). The participants were assigned at random to one of the two experimental conditions, the 5-AFC condition (IS participants) and the 10-AFC condition (12 participants).
Materials
The OJ questionnaire, the CJ feedback sheet, and the ROJ questionnaire contained the same items already used in Experiment 2. Thus, the OJ questionnaire and the ROJ questionnaire consisted of a total of 54 almanac questions, and the CJ feedback was given for 27 of the 54 questions. However, the response format was changed. Instead of generating an answer to each question, participants had to choose from a set of alternatives. Two versions of the OJ and ROJ questionnaires were constructed, one providing 5 and the other providing 10 response alternatives.
Again, half of the participants in each of the two experimental groups received feedback for the 27 Set 1 questions (the experimental items), whereas Set 2 questions served as control items. The other half of the participants in each experimental group received feedback for the 27 Set 2 questions (die experimental items), whereas Set 1 questions served as control items.
The response alternatives were constructed as follows: The 10-AFC questionnaire was constructed first. For each question, the response alternatives were to appear in numerical order, beginning with the lowest and ending with the highest value. The correct answer to each question was randomly assigned to 1 of the 10 possible positions of response alternatives. Next, plausible upper and lower bounds for the responses were determined, and these were assigned to Positions 1 and 10. If the correct answer had already been assigned to either Position 1 or Position 10, then only the upper bound or the lower bound had to be determined, respectively. In a final step, uniformly distributed random numbers were drawn from the interval (lower bound, upper bound) and assigned to the remaining response alternatives.
The 5-AFC questionnaire was derived from the 10-AFC questionnaire by preserving the upper bound, the lower bound, the correct answer, and two randomly selected response alternatives of the 10-AFC questionnaire (three response alternatives if the correct answer was not different from either the upper or the lower bound).
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 2. However, after providing their OJs, participants left to return 1 week later to fill out the ROJ questionnaires as in Experiment 2. The ROJ questionnaire was exactly the same as the OJ questionnaire; that is, for the 5-AFC group and the 10-AFC group the ROJ questionnaire contained 5 and 10 response alternatives, respectively. All participants were told that their task was to recall, as well as possible, the answers they had given on the OJ questionnaire. They were encouraged to ignore the CIs (which they had received 10 min earlier) when trying to recall their original answer. After the experiment, all participants were debriefed and the purpose of the experiment was described.
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Control Items
Experimental Items Item Type Figure 8 . Mean hindsight bias indices as a function of (a) whether the CJ (correct judgment) was or was not provided for a particular question, and (b) whether the questionnaires provided 5 or 10 response alternatives. 5 AFC = 5 alternatives forced-choice condition; 10 AFC = 10 alternatives forced-choice condition.
Design
The independent variables were (a) whether the CJ was or was not provided for a particular question (item type, within subject) and (b) whether the questionnaires contained 5 or 10 response alternatives (number of response alternatives, between subjects). Thus, the experiment was based on a 2 X 2 design.
Results and Discussion
Preliminary Analysis
As in the previous experiments, the medians of each participant's HB indices were calculated separately for control items and experimental items. Figure 8 presents the median hindsight bias indices, averaged across subjects. A 2X2 ANOVA with item type (control vs. experimental items) as a within-subject variable and number of response alternatives (5-AFC vs. 10-AFC) as a between-subjects variable on participants' median hindsight bias values revealed a significant main effect only of item type, F(l, 25) = 6.69, MSE = 4,683.33, flj = .21, and neither a significant main effect of the number of response alternatives, F(l, 25) < 1, nor a significant interaction between these variables, F(l, 25) = 1.60. Thus, the experiment demonstrated significant hindsight bias and no obvious difference between the two types of response formats used.
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Model Tests
The model tests are summarized in Table 8 , and Figure 9 illustrates the parameter estimates for the central parameters of the model. The raw frequencies underlying these model tests are shown in the Experiment 4 section of the Appendix. For obvious reasons, a rather high percentage of the 27 X 54 data points could not enter in the analyses because the OJ matched the CJ. In view of the limited set of response options, the percentages of OJ-CJ matches observed (28.02% of 810 OJs for the 5-AFC test and 15.90% of 648 OJs for the 10-AFC test) are not particularly impressive but nevertheless are significantly higher than those that can be predicted by assuming that participants select their OJs completely at random from the set of response alternatives (z > 5 in both cases). Thus, although we aimed at offering equally plausible response alternatives, at least some participants were obviously able to identify the CJ in the OJ questionnaire with a higher than chance probability.
As before, the first statistical test concerned the model's global fit to the data. Table 8 shows that the HB 13 model fits the data of the entire experiment well, and it also fits the data from each of the two conditions separately. The only parameter we expected to vary as a function of the experimental manipulation is h y which indicates the probability of hitting the correct answer by chance. The last row of data in Table 8 shows that h for the 5-AFC condition is indeed significantly different from h for the 10-AFC condition. Figure 9 illustrates that the estimates for h in the two conditions are not only in the expected rank order, but are 10 Because of the moderate sample size in Experiment 4, the statistical power of the F tests is not particularly large. Assuming an effect of/^(l -p) = .15 (whereft is the effect size index for F tests as denned by Cohen, 1977 , and p is the population correlation between the dependent measures), the power of the interaction test in Experiment 4 amounts to .78 for a -.05 (cf. Buchner, Faul, & Erdfelder, 1992) . Therefore, we cannot rule out weak or moderate effects of the response format on global HB measures that remained undetected by our F tests. However, because the present article focuses on the validity of the HB 13 model parameters, the power of the F tests is of minor importance compared with the power of the G also numerically in the order of magnitude that we expected given the number of alternatives on the response sheets.
Moreover, no other model parameter was affected by the response-alternatives manipulation.
There is again no evidence of any recollection biases for either the 5-AFC test or the 10-AFC test. Both G 1 statistics testing the hypothesis that r c = r E are even less than the df of the test (see the last row of data in Table 8 ). As a consequence, the complete hindsight bias effect observed in this experiment appears to have been due to reconstruction biases. Further, neither b nor r c and r E differ significantly between test formats. Therefore, neither a main effect nor an interaction effect of the test format can be observed in the analyses of the global HB indices.
General Discussion
In this article, we presented a model of the hindsight bias effect, the HB 13 model, that makes it possible to go beyond global indicators of the presence or absence of judgment distortions. The model provides measures for individual cognitive processes involved in the genesis of the hindsight bias phenomenon.
We have chosen a multinomial modeling approach within which we specified, in a processing tree model, a number of recollection and reconstruction processes that may bias the recall of one's own prior judgment of an event's outcome if that outcome is known at the time of recall. One problem seemed to be that hindsight bias data are usually continuous, Parameters Figure 9 . Probability estimates for the central parameters of the HB 13 model (Experiment 4). The error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals. HB = hindsight bias; 5 AFC = 5 alternatives forced-choice condition; 10 AFC = 10 alternatives forced-choice condition.
whereas processing tree models require the data to fall into mutually exclusive, discrete categories. To solve this problem, we suggested a focus on the OJ-CJ-ROJ rank orders. There is only a limited set of possible rank orders, and they preserve the central empirical information obtained from hindsight bias experiments. We have shown how the general HB 13 model can be transformed into submodels by using selective restrictions. Finally, we have presented the results of four experiments designed to assess the psychological validity of the HB 13 model.
Goodness of Fit and Model Falsifiability
Using the a = .05 level of significance as a criterion to discriminate between fit and lack of fit of the model, we have found that the HB 13 model adequately describes the global data patterns observed in each of the four experiments. This result is fostered by the finding that when analyzed at the level of individual experimental conditions, the model is compatible with the data in eight out of nine cases. The lack of fit observed for one data set seems to be no serious argument against the model: Given a Type 1 error probability of a = .05, one significant result in nine tests may well occur by chance even if the model holds for each of the nine underlying populations.
A potentially more serious objection refers to the statistical power of our goodness-of-fit tests. Obviously, the positive results obtained in our experiments can only be counted as evidence in favor of the HB 13 model if there was a high probability of detecting a lack of fit statistically, given that the model was actually false. To assess whether our model evaluation was biased by low statistical power, we conducted post hoc power analyses for each of the G 2 tests reported in this article. 11 We referred to Cohen's effect size measure w and his effect size conventions (see Cohen, 1977 , chapter 7) to specify different degrees of misfit in the underlying population. The parameter w can be regarded as a measure of the distance between the actual OJ-CJ-ROJ rank order probabilities in the underlying population and the corresponding probabilities as predicted by the HB 13 model. For the largest sample size used (N = 1,854 in Experiment 3, CJ-discredited condition), the power of the \ 2 goodness-of-fit test based on df = 5 and a = .05 is 1 -p = .93, even for an effect of size w = 0.1, which Cohen (1977) labeled small. In contrast, for the smallest sample size used (N -545 in Experiment 4, 10-AFC test condition), the power is insufficient in case of small effect sizes (yv = 0.1, 1 -p = .39) although still very good for moderate or larger effect sizes (w -0.3, 1 -|S > .99). Thus, our model tests had sufficient statistical power at least with respect to modest violations of the model and were nevertheless insignificant in almost all instances. We may therefore conclude that the model adequately describes the empirical facts in a number of different situations.
This alone would seem to be rather strong evidence in favor of our hindsight bias model. However, one startling question surfaces when focusing on the model's generally good fit to our experimental data. Could it perhaps be that our model is so flexible that it not only fits the data patterns as obtained from the four experiments reported above, but also fits almost any arbitrary data pattern?
We assessed this question in a simulation study. From the data of each of the nine experimental conditions observed in the four experiments, we constructed 300 different random data sets using the following algorithm. For each of the 10 different response categories (see Table 1 ) we assigned the empirical frequency data to another and randomly selected response category. This procedure was first carried out for the control items and then for the experimental items. Next we fitted the HB 13 model to each of these 2,700 artificial data sets resulting from random permutations of the observed frequencies. We observed how often (a) the model fitted a random data set better than the original empirical data, and (b) how often the likelihood ratio x 2 statistic G 2 exceeded a certain preset value. The results of this simulation study were clear-cut. They are summarized in Table 9 . Only in a very small number of cases (more precisely, in only 1.08% of all simulation runs) did our model fit the random data patterns better than the empirical data. In the vast majority of the model tests, the G 2 statistic was excessively high, indicating that the model could not at all describe these random data patterns. The results of this simulation study make us quite confident that the rather good model fits we observed throughout our four validation experiments were not obtained because the HB 13 model simply fits almost any arbitrary data pattern, but rather because this model describes the hindsight bias phenomenon quite well, and it does so across a range of different situations.
Model Parsimony
Another question one might have is whether the HB 13 model is an unnecessarily complex model of the hindsight bias phenomenon. In particular, the distinction between underestimated and overestimated OJs may seem superfluous. Is it possible to reduce the model, without loss of information, to a simpler model in which this distinction is dropped? This would be the case if the submodel HB 10 were to fit all available data sets. Recall that this submodel is based on the restrictions g n = g gU g u = g& and g B = g# as imposed onto HB 13. If these restrictions hold, then the model can be reduced to a model referring to only 5 observation categories for control as well as for experimental items by collapsing, for both item types, Rank Order Categories 1 and 6,2 and 7, 3 and 8,4 and 9, as well as 5 and 10. Although this simplified model is based on only 10 model equations rather than 20, it would allow us to estimate all HB 10 parameters except l c and / E (see Table 3 ). Table 10 shows the results of the statistical tests of the hypothesis that HB 13 can be reduced to HB 10. More precisely, the test statistics displayed represent the differences between G 2 values for the HB 10 and the HB 13 models when fitted to individual experimental conditions. 1 * The power analyses were conducted by means of the GPOWER program (Buchner et al. t 1992) . It is obvious from Table 10 that these differences are significant in four out of nine instances, given our data sets. This means that HB 13 cannot generally be reduced to HB 10, Therefore, HB 13 is not unnecessarily complex, and we recommend its use as the standard model of the present model family to analyze hindsight bias effects.
More Parameter Comparisons
The HB 13 model receives additional support from the findings that in each of the above experiments, the statistical tests performed on the model parameters confirmed our expectations about how the parameters would behave as a function of our experimental variations.
In the first experiment, OJs for both control and experimental items were recollected better if these OJs had been recalled right after they had been written down on the OJ questionnaire (parameter r c and r E ). In the second experiment, presenting the CJ information on the ROJ questionnaire elevated significantly the probability that reconstructions were biased by the CJ presentation (parameter b). The results from the third experiment show that discrediting the CJ information results in better retrieval of the OJs (parameter r E ) as has been concluded by Hasher et al. (1981) . Finally, in the fourth experiment we have shown that the guessing parameter h appropriately absorbs chance hits when the number of response alternatives is reduced to only 5 and 10, preventing guessing behavior from contaminating the parameters serving as measures of other processes. These results speak clearly in favor of the validity of our processing tree model of the hindsight bias, particularly because in all four experiments our manipulations affected the relevant parameters selectively and left untouched the other process measures.
All of these results have been obtained within individual experiments. However, now that we have an overview of the entire pattern of data, there are a few remarkable results to add that involve comparisons between experiments. Consider, for instance, the values for r c and r E for Experiments 1 and 2. A closer inspection of Figures 3 and 5 reveals that these parameter estimates are in the same order of magni- Note. HB = hindsight bias; CJ = correct judgment; 5 AFC = 5 alternatives forced choice; 10 AFC = 10 alternatives forced choice. *p < .05.
tude (for Experiment 1, the estimates for items recalled successfully and for those not recalled have to be averaged). These two experiments both involved the same retention interval of 1.5 hr. Turning now to Experiments 3 and 4, we find that these two experiments also involved an equivalent retention interval, but one that was longer than that for Experiments 1 and 2, namely 1 week. Consistent with these procedural properties, the estimates r c and r E for Experiments 3 and 4 are in the same order of magnitude, and they are considerably lower than r c and r B for Experiments 1 and 2. Thus, as one would expect from a valid measurement model of the hindsight bias phenomenon, estimates for the recollection parameters vary nicely as a function of the length of the retention intervals.
Further, consider the estimates for the source confusion parameter c, which are in the same order of magnitude for Experiments 1, 2, and 3. These estimates are rather low. In the first three experiments, participants' OJs were always self-generated, whereas the CJs were simply read on the CJ feedback sheet. In contrast, participants in Experiment 4 responded using a multiple choice questionnaire, which means that both the OJs and the CJs were similarly presented for reading, with the OJs perhaps receiving some additional processing related to the process of selecting one of the response alternatives. In any case, the sources of an OJ as opposed to a CJ were much more distinct for participants in Experiments 1-3 than for participants in Experiment 4. Consistent with this difference in source discriminability, we obtained a much Larger estimate of c for participants in Experiment 4 than for participants in the other three experiments.
We think these between-experiment comparisons add further support to the idea that the model presented in this article not only fits the empirical reality of hindsight bias situations quite well, but is also psychologically valid.
Perspectives for Model Applications
Although the present experiments were primarily aimed at evaluating the HB 13 measurement model, it seems that the present results may also be used to draw some preliminary conclusions about the appropriateness of current hindsight bias theories. For instance, it appears clear from the present results that reconstruction biases as measured by the model parameter b represent a major source of the hindsight bias phenomenon. Such a conclusion would be in line with theories claiming that anchor-and-adjustment or rejudgment strategies are the primary source of the hindsight bias effect (e.g., Stahlberg & Eller, 1993; Stahlberg et al., 1995) .
By contrast, evidence in favor of recollection bias explanations of the hindsight bias phenomenon is rather weak. In only one of the present experiments did we observe a statistically significant positive difference between the recollection parameters r c and r E which represent, respectively, the probabilities of correctly recollecting control and experimental items. Moreover, this single significant result is based on a rather large sample size (N = 1,601, standardfeedback condition of Experiment 3) and may thus have been due to the fact that the statistical power of the test was already huge even for tiny differences between r c and r E in the underlying population.
However, the conclusion that recollection biases do not contribute to hindsight bias effects would be premature. First, there is, at a descriptive level, a small but consistent trend for the r c estimates to be larger than the r E estimates in all four experiments, the single exception being the items for which recall failed in Experiment 1. Second, the weak or nonexistent recollection biases in Experiments 1 and 2 (in which a 1.5-hr retention interval was used) and the significant recollection bias observed in the standard feedback condition of Experiment 3 (1-week retention interval) fit nicely with the relative-trace-strength hypothesis as proposed by Hell et al. (1988) . It predicts that recollection biases are inversely affected by the memory trace strengths of the OJs. The lack of recollection biases observed in the other conditions of Experiments 3 and 4 may have been due to the debiasing effects of the CJ-discrediting manipulation (Experiment 3) and to the recognition test format, which presumably diminished retrieval-based recollection biases (Experiment 4). Third, with the exception of the longer retention intervals used in Experiments 3 and 4, our experimental manipulations were simply not aimed at maximizing the chances that recollection biases would occur. For example, we did not investigate any of the conditions that are known to maximize retroactive inhibition effects in verbal learning (see, e.g., McGeoch & Irion, 1952; Slamecka & Ceraso, 1960) . Fourth, Pohl and Gawlik (1995) , using a modified version of the present measurement model, reported results that appear consistent with the assumption of stronger recollection biases in hindsight compared with those observed in the present experiments. Unfortunately, their model has so far not been evaluated systematically, and it is therefore not easy to draw firm conclusions from their results. Thus, more research is needed with the HB 13 measurement model to clarify the role of recollection biases in hindsight.
Summary and Conclusions
To conclude, we have presented a multinomial model of the cognitive processes involved in the hindsight bias phenomenon. This model has been validated quite satisfactorily in a series of four experiments. The model fitted the data from different experimental conditions. The validation experiments involved manipulations for which we could formulate clear hypotheses. The central parameters of the models r c > r E , b y c, and h behaved as one would expect given our experimental manipulations, and this held true for comparisons within and between experiments.
We think we are now in a situation in which we can be quite confident that the model adequately captures the various processes underlying the typical hindsight bias effect. Consequently, future research can now concentrate on using the processing tree model to investigate the hindsight bias effect in novel experimental situations in order to analyze which processes or combinations of processes generate the observed phenomena.
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